Intrusion detection for industrial control systems by Lamon, Kurt
Eastern Washington University 
EWU Digital Commons 
EWU Masters Thesis Collection Student Research and Creative Works 
Winter 2021 
Intrusion detection for industrial control systems 
Kurt Lamon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.ewu.edu/theses 








In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree





Authorization to Submit Thesis
This Thesis of Kurt Lamon, submitted for the degree of Master of Science with a major in
Computer Science and entitled “Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems,”
has been reviewed in final form. Permission, as indicated by the signatures and dates given









Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are rapidly shifting from closed local networks, to remotely
accessible networks. This shift has created a need for strong cybersecurity anomaly and intru-
sion detection for these systems; however, due to the complexity and diversity of ICSs, well
defined and reliable anomaly and intrusion detection systems are still being developed.
Machine learning approaches for anomaly and intrusion detection on the network level
may provide general protection that can be applied to any ICS. This paper explores two ma-
chine learning applications for classifying the attack label of the UNSW-NB15 dataset. The
UNSW-NB15 is a benchmark dataset that was created off general network communications and
includes labels for normal behavior and attack vectors. A baseline was created using K-Nearest
Neighbors (kNN) due to its mathematical simplicity.
Once the baseline was created a feed forward artificial neural network known as a Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP), was implemented for comparison due to its ease of reuse for running
in a production environment. The experimental results show that both kNN and MLPs are
effective approaches for identifying malicious network traffic; although, both still need to be
further refined and improved before implementation on a real-world production scale.
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Glossary Of Terms
Anomaly Detection - A branch of machine learning where models search for outliers within
a dataset. Intrusion detection is a practical application of anomaly detection for cybersecurity.
Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection - A form of intrusion detection that seeks to classify
intrusions by determining which communications are out of the ordinary from the normal
behavior.
Industrial Control Systems - A collective term for the variety of electronic systems,
networks, and hardware that monitor and control industrial processes.
k-Nearest Neighbors - A simple supervised machine learning model that can be used for
both classification and regression.
Malware - Software that is designed to damage, intrude on, or compromise a system.
Multi-Layer Perceptron - A type of feedforward artificial neural network.
Precision - A performance metric that is the rate of correct positive predictions out of all
positive predictions.
Recall - A performance metric that is the proportion of negatives correctly predicted.
ROC AUC - The Receiver Operating Characteristic Area Under Curve is a performance
measure that combines the true positive and false positive rates.
Signature Based Intrusion Detection - A form of intrusion detection that seeks to classify
intrusions by exploring their similarity to a list of known intrusions. This method has lower
overhead to test data but cannot identify new attacks.
xiv
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems - A class of industrial control
systems that focus on receiving data from sensors, reporting that data, and making system
updates.
UNSW-NB15 - A benchmark dataset designed for testing intrusion detection systems.
Chapter 1 Introduction
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems are critical components of modern industrial infrastructure. In the past, these com-
ponents of critical infrastructure would run on closed, local networks or no network at all,
requiring a technician to be present on site to make changes or supervise the hardware. By
connecting these systems to a remotely accessible network, technicians enabled themselves to
control more complicated systems remotely as well as increasing and improving capabilities of
the infrastructure components, however doing so also enables the possibility of intrusion by
unauthorized parties. Bhamere et al. describe the security risks associated with opening these
systems to remote terminals [1].
Due to the diversity of industrial control systems and the infrastructure that they manage,
no unified rule-based security approach could be made. Stouffer et al. describes how due
the critical nature of industrial infrastructure, any sort of intrusion can result in catastrophic
consequences [2].
The diversity of malware and its constant evolution makes rule-based intrusion detection
ineffective at detecting novel attacks and requiring of regular updates. Buczak and Guven
describe this growth and the corresponding need for adaptable solutions [3]. Machine learning
approaches train an effective model to recognize complex patterns in existing data. This enables
the testing of new data to a high degree of accuracy, and can be updated with new labeled data
to improve performance in an ever changing environment. According to Liu and Lang, machine
learning algorithms for anomaly detection tend to have a lower missed rate but a higher false
alarm rate when compared to signature or misuse based detection methods [4].
Intrusion detection is a critical component of network security. It is not yet possible to
build a system that is perfectly closed to any outside agents while being open to correct ones,
therefore it is necessary to implement solutions that recognize when attacks are being launched
and notify the system of potential intrusions [2]. Intrusion detection is directly related to the
machine learning task of anomaly detection, identifying which behaviors are out of the ordinary
for a normal set of values.
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1.1 Literature Review
As cybersecurity, industrial control systems, and machine learning all make continuous ad-
vancements, each of these topics as well as their interdependence has been a widely explored
topic. Previous works researched applications and techniques for intrusion detection as well as
the challenges and options available for SCADA specific benchmark datasets.
Network intrusions can be determined by a variety of methods. Mudzingwa and Agrawal
group these IDS methods into three major approaches, Anomaly based Intrusion Detection
Systems (AIDS), Signature based Intrusion Detection Systems (SIDS), and hybrid approaches
which combine aspects of the other two [5]. SIDS work by comparing observed communica-
tion signatures to a local database or file of known malicious signatures. This approach has
exceptionally low overhead for both testing and implementing the system since no training or
learning of the environment is required. The drawback of SIDS is its inability to recognize
new attacks or ones that are not included in file. AIDS mitigates the weaknesses of SIDS by
using machine learning or statistical-based models to identify abnormal communications in the
network traffic. The benefit to AIDS is the ability to catch new attacks; however these systems
do so at the expense of training and learning time.
AIDS can also be further broken down into subcategories: Statistics based models, knowl-
edge based models, and machine learning models. Statistics based models define a profile for
normal behavior and flag any points that are then determined to be low probability. Knowledge
based models similarly create a profile for normal behavior and then flag any low probability
occurrences; what separates these models from the statistical category is knowledge based mod-
els are created using human knowledge about the system rather than automated data collected
from the system. Machine learning based models work by extracting knowledge from large
amounts of data and define complex transfer functions that flag individual points as anomalies
or intrusions. Khraisat et al. describe the approaches and respective challenges to creating
successful intrusion detection systems [6].
There are many different approaches within the realm of machine learning models for
anomaly detection. Khraisat et al. outline some of the more popular algorithms and their
proprietary effectiveness, including Decision Trees, Naive Bayes, Genetic Algorithms, Artificial
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Neural Networks, Fuzzy logic, Support Vector Machines, Hidden Markov Models, k-Nearest
Neighbors (kNN), and k-Means [6]. With a fairly basic Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) serial
communication dataset, the approaches of Naive Bayes, Random Forests, Non-Nested General-
ized Exemplars, Support Vector Machines, and some Decision Tree/rule-based approaches were
shown to be promising at detecting malicious communications [7].
Generalizing the dataset to include broader communications provides broader insights and
any models created could then potentially be utilized in multiple applications. Benchmark
datasets for network intrusion detection were created to analyze this problem. The UNSW-
NB15 dataset, created in 2015, improves upon the KDD-99 dataset which at that point was
becoming dated. Moustafa and Slay analyzed and described the UNSW-NB15 dataset in detail,
doing several statistical explorations to prove the quality of the dataset. The UNSW-NB15
dataset was validated to accurately mimic both normal and attack behavior and is shown to be
complex enough that any existing or novel Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) could
be reliably tested using the dataset [8].
4
Chapter 2 Dataset Selection
The UNSW-NB15 dataset was selected because it is one of several key Intrusion Detection
benchmark datasets. It is designed to represent normal and attack behaviors in modern network
traffic. Each data point represents one network packet or communication sent or received. The
dataset contains both normal behavior and nine different modern attack types [8].
2.1 Intrusion Detection Benchmark Datasets
The world of network connected computing systems is one experiencing extremely high growth,
change, and diversification. With so many devices, from every day IoT devices to large in-
frastructure systems, becoming increasingly dependent on network connectivity, the threat of
malware in these systems is also increasing, thus creating an express need for comprehensive
network cyber security. Hamid et al. describe that due to the wide diversity and growth rate of
these systems, it is ineffective to try to create measures of cyber defense on a per-system basis
[9].
Intrusion Detection benchmark datasets help mitigate the inefficiencies of per-system cyber
defense measures. Ring et al. survey the available IDS benchmark datasets to validate their
design and describe their intentions. These benchmark systems are specifically designed to be
more global in application and research, with the intent of developing solutions that can be
applied to any facet of network connected applications [10].
Many benchmark datasets have been created since the first notable dataset, DARPA, was
developed in 1998 [10]. Table 2.1 shows the progression of benchmark datasets created for
intrusion detection experiments.
Generally, each dataset incrementally improved upon the previous. The early datasets were
criticized for being generated with artificially created network traffic, both for attacks and
normal behavior, thereby lacking representative data of the problem space. As new datasets
were created to iterate, replace, or strengthen the previous, each had its own unique challenges
in data generation or sourcing. As network usage matures and evolves these datasets lose their
relevancy because the data they hold becomes less similar to modern architectures and attacks.
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Dataset Year Created Created By
DARPA 1998-1999 Lincoln Laboratory
KDD99 1998-1999 UC Irvine
DEFCON 2000 The Shmoo Group
CAIDA 2002/2016 Center of Applied Internet Data Analysis
LBNL 2004/2005 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
NSL-KDD 2009 University of New Brunswick
CDX 2009 United States Military Academy
Kyoto 2009 Kyoto University
Twente 2009 University of Twente
UMASS 2011 University of Massachusettes
ISCX 2012 University of New Brusnwick
ADFA 2013 University of New South Wales
UNSW-NB15 2015 Australian Centre for Cyber Security
Table 2.1: Development of intrusion detection benchmark datasets.
2.2 The UNSW-NB15 Dataset
The UNSW-NB15 dataset was created by researchers in the Cyber Range Lab of the Aus-
tralian Centre for Cyber Security in an effort to improve upon and update existing network
cybersecurity benchmark datasets. Previous benchmarks, the KDD99 and NSLKDD datasets,
the former explored by Özgür and Erdam and the latter explored by Dhanabal and Shantharaj,
were outdated because attacks have become more advanced and low profile and normal network
behavior has also changed [11]. In the analysis of Moustafa and Slay, the UNSW-NB15 dataset
is shown to have updated both the attacks and normal behavior to represent more modern
network traffic [8].
The UNSW-NB15 dataset was created by simulating normal network traffic and attacks
using the IXIA PerfectStorm and tcpdump tools to capture network data. Then the Argus
and Zeek-IDS tools were used to extract feature information into CSV-formatted datasets. The
UNSW-NB15 dataset consists of approximately 2.5 million rows and is split into four CSV files
[8].
While this dataset is seemingly very comprehensive, it is also succeptible to becoming
dated due to the growth and diversification of both normal behavior and malware. Although
this dataset is still relevant, it will eventually need to be updated and replaced as the needs of
network communications and the ways hackers exploit them change.
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Attributes and Structure
The UNSW-NB15 dataset has 49 features that each describe some attribute of a communication
or its context within an arriving set of communications. Most features are continuous but some
are categorical and two are binary. The dataset also contains label and metadata for the type of
attack, attack vs normal, and dataset indexing. Excluding the labels and metadata, Moustafa
and Slay divide the informational features into five categories [8]:
1. Flow Features: Features that identify the hosts/recipients of a communication and the
communication protocol.
2. Basic Features: Features that contain meta-information about the particular instance
of connection and communication, such as the duration or size of the communication,
time-to-live, etc.
3. Content Features: Features describing attributes of TCP/IP and HTTP services.
4. Time Features: Features describing the timing information of the particular communi-
cation.
5. Additional Generated Features: General purpose generated flags and statistical in-
formation about the content and delivery of the communication, or statistical information
about the particular communications relationship to surrounding communications.
See Appendix A.1 for information on individual features within each of these groups.
Attacks and Intrusions
Where the previous benchmark datasets lacked present day attack vectors, the UNSW-NB15
dataset supplements this with attacks classified into nine groups:
1. Fuzzers: Attacks characterized by feeding a system large amounts of data in attempt to
make it crash.
2. Analysis: Intrusions that target web applications through ports, email, or scripts in
order to gain entrance.
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3. Backdoor: Connections that attempt to circumvent normal security measures of a we-
bapp, attempting to gain access for an external user.
4. Denial of Service (DoS): An attack designed to occupy the resources of a system,
causing it to be too busy to respond to legitimate users.
5. Exploit: An attack that takes advantage of a particular unintended vulnerability of a
system.
6. Generic: An attack that seeks to identify collision with every block cipher of a system.
7. Reconnaissance: A probe designed to gain information about a system without neces-
sarily intruding or causing damage.
8. Shellcode: An attack where shell scripts are used to gain entrance to the code of a web
application.
9. Worms: An attack where the malware seeks to replicate itself across a network once it
has gained entrance.
The dataset is approximately 87% non-malicious values and 13% attack values. Table 2.2
illustrates the distribution of attack categories in the dataset.
Attack Category Label Count Percentage
normal 0 2,218,764 87.3513%
generic 1 215,481 8.4833%
exploits 1 44,525 1.7529%
fuzzers 1 24,246 0.9545%
dos 1 16,353 0.6438%
reconnaissance 1 13,987 0.5507%
analysis 1 2,677 0.1054%
backdoor 1 2,329 0.0917%
shellcode 1 1,511 0.0595%
worms 1 174 0.0069%
Table 2.2: UNSW-NB15 attack type distribution
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2.3 Comparison: UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD
The DARPA dataset was one of the original datasets created for IDS testing. It was designed
by running network traffic in a simulated air force base for two weeks, followed by five weeks of
attack traffic. The KDD99 set was then created by processing the DARPA logs. Because of the
preprocessed format of the KDD99 dataset, it became more popular for machine learning ex-
periments. Later, the NSL-KDD dataset was created by removing redundancies and duplicates
from KDD99. The NSL-KDD dataset effectively reduced the size of KDD99 without taking
away from the knowledge that it represents, as described by Özgür and Erdam [12].
The NSL-KDD dataset, while an improvement on KDD99, retains all of the shortcomings
of KDD99 as well. The attacks featured in KDD99 and NSL-KDD are limited and lack many
of the attacks that modern networks face. Each of the attacks in the NSL-KDD and KDD99
datasets can be divided into four categories:
1. Denial of Service (DoS) - attempting to overwhelm a system in order to make it unavailable
to legitimate users.
2. R2L - Unauthorized access or password guessing, remote to local.
3. U2R - Unauthorized access to a root account, user to root.
4. Probing - Observation of a system in order to gain information about that system.
The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains similar versions of each of these attack categories, as well
as more modern ones. The UNSW-NB15 dataset also contains more up to date normal behavior
as well as a more appropriate balance of normal and attack behaviors. Where NSL-KDD is
imbalanced towards attacks, the UNSW-NB15 emphasizes on normal behaviors.
2.4 Comparison: UNSW-NB15 and ICS Attack Datasets
T. Morris provides a collection and survey of several ICS specific datasets. These datasets are
created from simulated critical infrastructure systems, including a gas pipeline, a water storage
tank, and a power supply system [13]. Each of these datasets includes both generic network
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data as well as data specific to each piece of infrastructure, including setpoints for pipeline
pressure and PID controller values.
These datasets could be very useful in the future when determining potential models for
specific systems, however, as current research is exploring more general solutions, the UNSW-
NB15 dataset would likely apply more broadly to systems outside these ones listed.
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Chapter 3 Architectural Overview
This thesis expands on the existing work related to creating and evaluating intrusion detection
systems for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. In the experiments of S. Maji, logistic regression, gradient
boosted decision trees, ensemble classifiers, and other machine learning models were used. The
ensemble method performed best as it was able to combine the strengths of multiple types of
classifiers [14].
This thesis is structured in the following general machine learning pipeline:
1. Data Preprocessing: Null values, alternate spellings, and out of range values must be
adjusted to expected ranges and data types before applying any machine learning model.
2. Exploratory Data Analysis: General data exploration yields insights into the dataset
providing assistance for feature engineering. This can include correlation analysis and
exploring dataset metrics.
3. Feature Engineering: Certain features can be dropped, scaled, transformed, or created
to add new insights to the dataset or to remove unnecessary complexity before applying
machine learning models.
4. Baseline Model Implementation: An easy-to-implement model was used to create
a baseline for expectations of the more advanced model. This application of k-Nearest
Neighbors (kNN) is used as the baseline model.
5. Advanced Model Implementation: A more advanced model is used to explore the
dataset. For this application, a Multi-Layer Perceptron neural network was used as the
more advanced model.
6. Performance Metrics and Analysis: Once predictions are made for the baseline and
advanced models’ test sets, the effectiveness of these models can be explored. Due to
dataset balancing constraints, both F1 score and accuracy were analyzed.
One key component of exploration is assessing the success of the advanced model. According
to Zuech et al. a successful application will be highly accurate, minimize false alarms, and be
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able to recognize many different attacks [15].
This thesis develops a k-Nearest Neighbors classifier for identifying attacks to use as the
baseline comparison for a subsequent MLP approach.
This application is theoretical in nature and should be viewed in the context of a preliminary
step in identifying the most effective system that could be implemented in a production network
environment. This work focused on quantitative analysis of the results, F1 score, measures of
accuracy, etc; Stouffer et al. describe that it is important to consider the qualitative measures
associated with each potential model [2]. Qualitative measures are minimally explored but it is
useful to consider the training time, testing time, and ease of updates to the model as measures
of what might make an applicable industry implementation. Additionally, the repercussions
of a successful cyber attack on an industrial control system can be immense, so any approach
that is short of perfect must still be improved or combined with additional efforts before being
deemed effective enough to be put into production.
3.1 Data Preprocessing
While the UNSW-NB15 dataset is of very high quality and is relatively comprehensive, there
are still a few steps required to prepare data and clean it before it is ready for model application.
The data is stored in four separate CSV files that must be combined into a unified data structure.
In this application a Pandas dataframe in Python was used, though any data structure can be
used.
Only a few columns required preprocessing for null values or mismatched data types. The
columns ”ct ftp cmd” and ”is ftp login”, containing the count of ftp commands in the sessions
and a boolean flag if the ftp session was accessed by user and password, needed to be recast
from objects to integers. The aforementioned columns as well as the columns ”attack cat”
and ”ct flw http mthd”, containing the attack type label and the count of HTTP flows in the
session, needed to have null values filled. Because each of these columns had meaningful null
values, indicating that the specific column did not apply to that particular data point, the nulls
were replaced with a meaningful categorical point indicating the same effect. If there were any
continuous variables with null values, those should be replaced with the mean of the training
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data for that feature. Two columns, ”attack cat” and ”ct ftp cmd”, also included categorical
data points that were either misspelled or out of range. These were fixed with replacement
lambda functions.
3.2 Exploratory Data Analysis
The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains over 2.5 million rows and 49 features. In effort to save
a significant amount of computing requirements, it is crucial to identify redundancies in data,
namely any pieces of data that may be eliminated without cost to the effectiveness of the model,
as is shown in the S. Maji’s exploration [14]. This was explored through various correlation
analysis.
Finding the correlation between variables helped identify possible redundancies. Main-
taining a set of redundant variables does not serve to add any additional insight to a machine
learning model. When compared to keeping only one of the variables, the model should perform
nearly as well but with improved training and testing time. Figure 3.1 shows the correlation
between features of the UNSW-NB15 dataset in a heatmap.
Finding the correlation between features of the dataset and the attack label serves as a
helpful preliminary step at identifying which features might be particularly useful for a classifier.
Appendix A.2 gives the correlations between each feature and the attack category for the
UNSW-NB15 dataset.
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The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains two variables, sbytes and dbytes, that represent the source
bytes and destination bytes. Summing these two variables results in a new vector for the
total number of bytes exchanged in the communication. While this information can be easily
determined from the data, listing it explicitly may provide additional insight for the system.
It was also necessary to drop columns that are unhelpful to the machine learning models.
For both kNN and MLP, any features that were specific to the generation of the dataset (IP
addresses, timestamps, etc) were dropped. This included srcip, sport, dstip, dsport, stime, and
ltime.
For the MLP model, one out of any two features that were highly correlated, having a
correlation value of greater than 0.95, with each other were dropped. The features dropped due
to high correlation were sloss, dloss, dpkts, dwin, ltime, ct srv dst, and ct src dport ltm. The
correlation values for these features with their highly correlated pairs can be found in table 3.1.
A heatmap of all features correlations can be found in figure 3.1.






Table 3.1: Pairs of features with correlations higher than 0.95 along with
whether or not they were kept in the feature set for the machine learning
approaches used.
For kNN, any features that were highly correlated with the attack label served as a helpful
starting point at selecting a feature set. These correlations can be found in Appendix A.2.
Any remaining columns needed to be feature scaled or encoded to avoid larger features
overshadowing smaller ones. Each continuous feature was normalized by z-score to a mean of






Figure 3.2: Label distribution on the train/test split.
Each categorical, non-binary feature was one-hot encoded into a group of binary features.
Each feature in the group would represent one possible value of the original variable and within
that group, one feature would be flagged as true to indicate that original category.
Before the data can be used in machine learning applications, it needs to be split into a
training set and a testing set. For both subsequent models, an 80/20 train/test split was used.
Figure 3.2 shows the proportions of attack labels between the training and testing sets, verifying
that they both have an appropriately similar distribution.
3.4 Performance Metrics
Performance metrics for this application can be divided into two general categories: how effec-
tive the model is and how practical the model is. Measures regarding how effective the model
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is were created using information from the test set predictions and actual values.
Predicted Attack Predicted Normal
Actual Attack True Positive False Negative
Actual Normal False Positive True Negative
Table 3.2: Predicted values vs. actual values. Combinations of these fields
are used in a variety of performance metrics.
F1 Score
The UNSW-NB15 dataset is heavily skewed towards normal data points. This makes looking
at individual statistics and the general accuracy ineffective. S. Raschka describes that the
F-Measure is an effective measure for such datasets [16].
The F1 Score is the F-Measure of a binary classifier. It combines both the precision and













Equation 3.2 is the equation for the F1 score of a system’s performance. A perfect F1 score
is 1, indicating both perfect precision and recall. The worst possible F1 score is 0, indicating
either 0 precision or 0 recall.
The F1 measure is a good measure for this data because of the high skew towards normal
values. The F1 measure equally weights the precision and recall, so a successful model can only




The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve plots the True Positive Rate (TPR) seen in
equation 3.5 against the False Positive Rate (FPR) seen in equation 3.6. The area under curve
(AUC) of the ROC curve is a measure of how effective a model is at making correct predictions
[17]. A perfect ROC AUC score is 1, indicating no mis-classifications, and a score above 0.5










The two components of the ROC AUC score represent two critical classification rate in
intrusion detection. The TPR represents the ability that the model has to correctly identify
attacks. In intrusion detection, this is a particularly critical score, as the repercussions for a
false negative are greater than that of a true positive. The FPR, or False Alarm Rate (FAR),
identifies the tendency of the model to misclassify normal behaviors as malicious [15]. While a
high FAR is still not good, the damage caused in an ICS by flagging normal communications
as possibly malicious is generally significantly less than allowing attacks in.
3.5 Baseline Analysis: kNN
The k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) classifier works by comparing an unknown data point to known,
labeled data points and taking a vote of the k nearest points, by some established distance
measure. Lin et al. support kNN as generally a good baseline for machine learning approaches
because it is easy to implement and will correctly classify a majority of data points, so long
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as they are relatively clustered with each other. In intrusion detection, this inherent cluster-
ing is often the case because if a vulnerability is found, exploits will generally focus on that
vulnerability and end up looking similar to each other [19].
kNN generally serves as an excellent benchmark for intrusion detection applications. With
many attacks exploiting a particular vulnerability or pattern, clusters naturally appear around
these types of communications [19]. This makes kNN a good benchmark because it is easy
to implement and will catch a bulk of the attacks. Additionally, the extremely large size and
depth of attacks that the UNSW-NB15 dataset holds is likely to make clusters more definite as
attacks are likely to be repeated with minor changes. However, new attacks, attacks specific to
an individual system, and outliers are harder to catch with kNN.
Distance Measures
To perform kNN, the data needs to be in a form that enables a distance measure to be taken
[20]. Most commonly, this is the Euclidean distance measure. Categorical data requires some
manipulation before a distance measure can be applied. The one-hot encoding process from the
feature engineering step enabled the Euclidean algorithm to be used. One downfall of kNN is its
inability to use multiple distance measures. In a situation with only binary categorical features,
the Jaccard distance could be used more effectively than the Euclidean distance. Given the
mixed nature of the dataset as well as the heavy favor towards continuous features, Euclidean
distance worked effectively.
As an algorithm, kNN identifies clusters of data points to assert label membership. By
nature, distance measures between points are inherently linear. Should the data have more
complex, non-linear relationships between variables and the label, kNN may miss these irregular
or non-linear clusters.
Feature Selection
Since the UNSW-NB15 dataset has a relatively small feature set, it is possible to run kNN
across all features. However, looking into the spread of correlations between individual features
and the label vector makes it clear that certain variables would be more beneficial than others.
Additionally, lowering the number of features included would also substantially improve the
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runtime of the algorithm. It is important to choose the correct subset of variables to use.
Because kNN must compare all variables for each data point in order to classify, the runtime
requirements can be excessively high for testing each data point. Additionally, certain variables
can confound the clusters and adversely contribute to proper classification.
Determining the perfect subset of features to use for kNN, the one that finds the global
maximum accuracy score, required a comprehensive search of all feature permutations. Since
the dataset has 49 features, this would be an excessively time consuming feat. Instead, a variety
of methods were used to find a satisfactory local maximum accuracy score.
To streamline the development process, a randomly selected one tenth subset of the data
was selected each run for intermediate testing. The full set was only used to determine the final
baseline score and to occasionally validate results along the way.
Determining an optimal feature set was done as follows:
1. A test was run on the full feature set of the data.
2. Subsequent tests were run on the feature sets that the original UNSW-NB15 paper out-
lined; basic features, flow features, content features, time features, and additional gener-
ated features.
3. Each of these tests were run several times to establish which value of k, the number of
neighbors used for classification, would be most effective. This was determined to be
k = 5 and was used for the remaining tests.
4. It was noted that the basic features feature set performed the best, followed by the full
feature set.
5. Feature correlations were calculated between the informational (non-meta) features of the
dataset and the attack label.
6. Test were run on different combinations of the most strongly correlated feature, including
positive, negative, and mixed correlations.
7. Beyond the first few features, correlation was not a helpful indicator of kNN accuracy, so
individual features were tested instead.
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Figure 3.3: The resulting kNN accuracy by adding features in order of best
individual kNN performance.
8. kNN was run on individual features and they were then ordered by performance.
9. Starting with the best performers, sbytes and sload, the next features were added on and
their group performance was noted along with whether or not it was more effective than
without the new feature.
10. Each feature that resulted in a positive delta performance was then grouped together
and the process was repeated until a satisfactory result, a local maximum accuracy, was
obtained.
The first iteration of testing features resulted in a maximum accuracy score of 0.92675.
Appendix A.3 shows the strength of each feature in a single-feature kNN. This is the order that
features were then tested in the group. Figure 3.3 shows the group performance as each new
feature was added.
The second iteration of testing features began with the set created by taking only the
features that had a positive effect on the group performance from the previous test. Adding
these features incrementally produced figure 3.4. Notably, the best performance of this resulted
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Figure 3.4: The resulting kNN accuracy created by adding features that
resulted in a positive accuracy delta during the previous test (iteration 2).
in an improved accuracy of 0.9573.
This process was repeated again, taking only the features that resulted in a positive delta
from iteration two and adding them incrementally. The resulting best kNN accuracy of 0.9562
was never able to surpass the previous best, so it was determined that a local maximum had
been reached, and the optimal feature set would be the one that resulted in the best score from
iteration two. Figure 3.5 shows the relative performance of this test.
Ultimately, the final feature set was comprised of 16 features: sbytes, sload, smeansz, dload,
dbytes, dmeansz, ct state ttl, sinpkt, sttl, spkts, dloss, ct srv dst, ct dst src ltm, ct dst ltm, trans -
depth, and ct ftp cmd. Some of these features listed were one-hot encoded; for simplicity of
listing values, each group of encoded columns has been grouped back into their original column
name. The method used for parameter selection is not guaranteed to produce the optimal
result. Because of the complexity of the dataset features, not all possible combinations could
be tested and not all possible methods of feature engineering could be applied in a reasonable
amount of both development and run time. However, the feature selection done should yield a
value at or close to a local maximum with results satisfactory for a baseline assessment.
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Figure 3.5: The resulting kNN accuracy created be adding features that
resulted in a positive accuracy delta during the previous test (iteration 3).
In exploring the effectiveness of individual features on kNN results, certain features, when
added or removed from the active feature set, could either increase or decrease the accuracy of
the algorithm, depending on the remaining feature set used. Due to the linear nature of kNN
and this fact that certain features can be more effective when paired leads to the hypothesis
that there are more complex patterns in the data that, if properly identified, may yield better
results than the kNN baseline.
3.6 Advanced Method: Multi-Layer Perceptron
A Multi-Layer Perceptron supervised learning algorithm and is a form of neural network that
includes one or more hidden layers [21]. It can be used as both a classifier or a regressor but in
this application we will be using its classifier functionality. The MLP classifier seeks to learn a
non-linear function.
f(·) : Rm− > Ro (3.7)
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Equation 3.7 describes a multi-layer perceptron where m is the dimensionality of the feature
set and o is the possible options for classification. The model is trained using the backpropoga-
tion algorithm over the training set. Tests are then evaluated by passing the m features of
the test point into the input of the model and the resulting o options are then output with a
likelihood weight. The highest weight is then assigned as the classification.
In this instance, after one-hot encoding the input data has 197 features: m = 197. Because
the data is binary classified as attack or not, the output vector is size 2: o = 2.
Multi-Layer Perceptrons are able to represent complex non-linear functions. Each neuron in
the neural network implements a weighted linear sum of the values output by the neurons of the
previous layer. By combining multiple layers, a neural network is able to identify and represent
complex non-linear functions. This is particularly useful in intrusion detection because while
many attack data points fall into linear clusters, capturing new or more sophisticated attacks
requires non-linear capabilities.
Multi-Layer Perceptrons are susceptible to local minimums dependent on the random weight
initialization of the untrained model. A given set of tuned parameters does not guarantee the
best possible outcome of the model or an identical outcome from retraining a similar model.
Once an MLP classifier is built and trained, testing datapoints is very quick and the testing
and classification of data can be used to continue to train the model in production. In a network
environment where network communications are changing and adapting, this can make a model
longer standing.
One of the benefits and challenges of an MLP are the variety of hyperparameters available
to tune. These options enable MLP classifiers to be effective in a multitude of applications
but they also then need to be tuned to determine an effective configuration, which can be time
consuming.
Hyperparameter Tuning
The most significant hyperparameters available to the MLP Classifier are the activation function
and the solver which are used for the initialization of weights and for how they are updated
in training. The particular choice of activation function and solver also unlocks additional
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parameters that can be tuned.
Hyper-parameter tuning also requires performance metrics to assess and validate perfor-
mance. For this, the F1 score and ROC AUC scores were chosen, prioritizing ROC AUC and
then F1, though the performance of these two measures will generally scale together as can also
be seen in the experiments of S. Maji [14].
Since the UNSW-NB15 dataset contains such a large number of datapoints, a stochastic
gradient descent based optimization function for the solver is likely the best selection. The
Sci-Kit Learn libraries give two such options: SGD and Adam. Beginning with each of these,
most of the remaining hyperparameters do not have any intuitive best answer and will need to




Activation Function identity, logistic, tanh, relu
Alpha 1e-5, 0.0001, 0.001




Activation Function identity, logistic, tanh, relu
Alpha 1e-5, 0.0001, 0.001
Table 3.3: Multi-Layer Perceptron hyper-parameter configurations tested
Parameters are tuned and options are explored using a twice validated gridsearch to ensure
the results are reliable. Ultimately, 72 tests were run for the SGD solver, 36 different parameter
combinations twice validated, and 24 tests were run for the Adam solver, 12 different parameter
combinations twice validated. In an ideal scenario, these tests would be five times validated,




The kNN algorithm achieved varying results depending on the selection of variables used for
analysis.
The locally optimal feature set selected contained the following 16 features: sbytes, sload,
smeansz, dload, dbytes, dmeansz, ct state ttl, sinpkt, sttl, spkts, dloss, ct srv dst, ct dst src ltm,
ct dst ltm, trans depth, and ct ftp cmd. It was also determined that the most effective value
of k is 5. Running kNN with these configurations produced an F1 score of 0.9720 and a ROC





Table 4.1: The confusion matrix for the best kNN predictions
As a baseline exploration, these results are highly promising. For the optimized feature set,
0.97 is a high F1 score, especially for a straightforward algorithm like kNN with little to no
feature engineering. Additionally, the fact that a smaller subset of features produced not only
a more time efficient run but better results.
4.2 Multi-Layer Perceptron
The Multi-Layer Perceptron Artificial Neural Network has many more parameters to fine tune
than the kNN baseline. Some of the parameters can be selected with confidence by looking
at their design and documentation but other required experimentation and testing to find an
optimized set.
Many of the MLP hyper parameters are dependent on the particular solver function.
Each test begins with a solver function and uses gridsearch to tune the corresponding hyper-
parameters.
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Table 4.2 summarizes each experiment and its results.
Test #1: Solver=sgd
Parameter Options tested Best Selected
Solver sgd sgd
Activation Function identity, logistic, tanh, relu relu
Alpha 1e-5, 0.0001, 0.001 1e-5




Parameter Options tested Best Selected
Solver adam adam
Activation Function identity, logistic, tanh, relu tanh
Alpha 1e-5, 0.0001, 0.001 1e-5
F1 Score: 0.9697
ROC AUC: 0.9828
Table 4.2: Multi-Layer Perceptron tests and hyper-parameter configurations
Test #1: Stochastic Gradient Descent Solver
The first test used the Stochastic Gradient Descent solver (SGD), and tested the hyper-
parameters activation, alpha, and learning rate. The most effective combination, an activation
function of Rectified Linear Unit (RELU) function, an alpha value of 0.00001, and an adaptive
learning rate, resulted in an F1 score of 0.9633 and a ROC AUC score of 0.9825. The most
significant hyper-parameters in this test were the activation function and learning rate. An
adaptive learning rate runs similar to a constant learning rate, but decreases each time con-
secutive epochs fail. Where a constant rate would quit early, the adaptive rate will narrowly
approach the local maximum more before quitting. This explains the similar, yet marginally
better results of the adaptive rate, as well as it’s additional runtime.
Test #2: Adam Solver
The second test used the solver Adam, a modified Stochastic Gradient Descent function, and
tuned the hyper-parameters activation and alpha. The most effective configuration, an acti-
vation function of hyperbolic tangent (tanh) and an alpha of 1e-5, resulted in an F1 score of
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0.9697 and a ROC AUC score of 0.9828.
Analysis
While there was some variation in effectiveness, the parameters that were the most significant
between tests were activation functions of either tanh or relu, outperforming the other options
across both tests. Additionally, smaller alpha values also gave better results at the cost of
higher runtime.
The best tuned MLP classifier from Test #2 produced results with an F1 score of 0.9679 and





Table 4.3: The confusion matrix for the best MLP predictions
Comparing with the baseline results of kNN, this is a reasonably close score. A visual
comparison of the performances of kNN and the two MLP tests is presented in figure 4.1. With
the shorter test runtime of a trained neural network, this approach is arguably more practical
than the kNN baseline; however, this model would still need to be improved or paired with other
systems before it is sufficient for a production system. Other experiments have also produced
better F1 scores than this one achieved by the MLP system [14].
Presumably, more exploratory data analysis and feature engineering could yield even better
results by enabling the discovery of new patterns that may not be visible or as pronounced
in this model. Additionally, the abundance of parameters to tune led to discovering a local
maximum in performance and not the global maximum. With so many parameters to tune
and the runtime required for training the neural network, it was not feasible to guarantee best
results by a particular configuration.
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Figure 4.1: The performances of kNN, MLP stochastic gradient descent
solver, and MLP Adam solver.
4.3 kNN and MLP Performance by Attack Category
Attack Type No. Correct No. Incorrect Accuracy
No Attack 441756 1966 0.9956
Generic 43051 20 0.9995
Exploits 8771 155 0.9826
Analysis 458 84 0.8450
Fuzzers 3266 1554 0.6776
DOS 3247 51 0.9845
Reconnaissance 2771 47 0.9833
Backdoor 474 1 0.9979
Shellcode 295 18 0.9425
Worms 25 0 1
Table 4.4: MLP predictions by attack category
Table 4.4 shows the prediction success dependent on the type of attack for the MLP classifier
while table 4.5 shows the prediction success dependent on the type of attack for the kNN
classifier. Table 4.6 shows the comparative performance between the kNN and MLP classifiers.
Compared to the kNN classifier, the MLP model excelled at backdoor, shellcode, and worm
attacks. The MLP model comparatively performed the worst at fuzzer attacks but was very
29
Attack Type No. Correct No. Incorrect Accuracy
No Attack 442006 1716 0.9961
Generic 43040 31 0.9993
Exploits 8713 213 0.9761
Analysis 458 84 0.8450
Fuzzers 3380 1440 0.7012
DOS 3251 47 0.9857
Reconnaissance 2791 27 0.9904
Backdoor 468 7 0.9853
Shellcode 280 33 0.8946
Worms 23 2 0.92
Table 4.5: kNN predictions by attack category
close for remaining attacks/normal values. Looking at the sizes of each subset, The kNN clas-
sifier performed better on attack categories with larger data points whereas the MLP classifier
performed better on categories with fewer data points.
Attack kNN Performance MLP Performance Improvement
No Attack 0.9961 0.9956 -0.0005
Generic 0.9993 0.9995 +0.0002
Exploits 0.9761 0.9826 +0.0065
Analysis 0.8450 0.8450 ±0
Fuzzers 0.7012 0.6776 -0.0236
DOS 0.9857 0.9845 -0.0012
Reconnaissance 0.9904 0.9833 -0.0071
Backdoor 0.9853 0.9979 +0.0126
Shellcode 0.8946 0.9425 +0.0479
Worms 0.92 1 +0.08
Table 4.6: Comparison of the kNN and MLP performance by attack
category
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Future Work
Multi-Layer Perceptrons exemplified a potentially effective measure of intrusion detection for
network cybersecurity. Achieving an F1 score of 0.9679 and a ROC AUC score of 0.9828, as
compared to the kNN F1 score of 0.9720 and ROC AUC score of 0.9834. MLP was also able to
improve upon the accuracy of kNN for lesser recorded attacks. MLPs illustrated that they were
able to begin to recognize some of the complex patterns of identifying attack vectors in network
communications while retaining general performance. Additionally, once trained, MLPs make
a practical application of machine learning for network intrusion detection due to their shorter
testing time.
Machine learning models targeting more complex patterns, such as MLP, are generally
benefited by the comprehensive nature of the dataset. The fact that kNN performed best on a
smaller subset of the dataset’s features than the MLP approach also indicates that the inclusion
of detailed data when analyzing network communications benefits machine learning methods
targeting more complex patterns.
The UNSW-NB15 dataset represents more generic network traffic than could typically be
found within an ICS setting. The inclusion of this more specific data would enable a more
effective model however limiting the scope of the system to that in which the data was recorded.
Based on the data in this thesis, the results from kNN and the MLP classifier were satisfac-
tory for intrusion detection, however they are not yet sufficient for a system that can be trusted
for critical infrastructure systems in production.
Both systems in this thesis were binary classifiers trained on a dataset of both known
anomalies and normal traffic. This would make both systems unlikely to catch zero-day attacks
unless they particularly resembled an existing attack. The MLP approach can be restructured
into a regressor that predicts the likelihood that a particular data point is an anomaly rather




Further development of intrusion detection for Industrial Control Systems, would benefit from
a few genres to be expanded:
ICS Specific Datasets: The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains general information that
can be applied to nearly any network-connected device. To build strong defenses for a given
industrial control system, it would be helpful to also explore ICS specific datasets, particularly
those that represent systems similar to the one to be protected.
Improving the Dataset: The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains exceptional information on
general network traffic. Expanding into ICS-specific traffic would give more insights into the
benefits and challenges of setting up an Intrusion Detection And Prevention System (IDPS).
Exploratory Data Analysis: There are multiple ways to scale and represent feature
values within the dataset. In these experiments each feature was represented on its original
scale; it is possible that some features provide more insight into the data if scaled in other ways.
For example, logarithmic representations of some of the data or boxing it into categories may
improve the performance of a model. This concept would require additional exploratory data
analysis to assess these correlations with the attack labels before they can be tested on existing
machine learning models.
Exploring other methodologies: Neural networks and multi-layer perceptrons are only
one of many machine learning models that yield successful results in such an experiment. Adding
to the MLP approach by exploring other tuning factors, models, and combinations of models
could yet give results that surpass those of this experiment. Additionally, a replicator neural
network or an autoencoder could be used in place of the multi-layer perceptron. These models
specialize at anomaly detection. The success of the MLP approach would merit an exploration
into those models for an ICS intrusion detection system.
Model Assessment: F1 score and ROC AUC are two of the most effective means of
measuring performance of an intrusion detection system. There are other methods for assessing
the effectiveness of a system which should be explored.
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Appendix
A.1 UNSW-NB15 Features and Feature Groups
Features and Feature Groups from Nour Moustafa and Jill Slay [8]
Flow Features
No. Feature Name Description
1 srcip Source IP address
2 sport Source port number
3 dstip Destination IP address
4 dsport Destination Port number
5 proto Protocol type
Basic Features
No. Feature Name Description
6 state Indicates that state and its dependent protocol
7 dur Record total duration
8 sbytes Source to destination bytes
9 dbytes Destination to source bytes
10 sttl Source to destination time to live
11 dttl Destination to source time to live
12 sloss Source packets re-transmitted or lost
13 dloss Destination packets re-transmitted or lost
14 service Such as http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns, and ftp-data
15 sload Source bits per second
16 dload Destination bits per second
17 spkts Source to destination packet count




No. Feature Name Description
19 swin Source TCP window advertisement value
20 dwin Destination TCP window advertisement value
21 stcpb Source TCP base sequence number
22 dtcpb Destination TCP base sequence number
23 smeansz Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the
source
24 dmeansz Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the
destination
25 trans depth Represents the pipelined depth into the connec-
tion of http request/response transaction
26 res bdy len Actual uncompressed content size of the data
transferred from the server’s http response
Time Features
No. Feature Name Description
27 sjit Source jitter in milliseconds
28 djit Destination jitter in milliseconds
29 stime Record start time
30 ltime Record last time
31 sinpkt Source inter-packet arrival time in milliseconds
32 dinpkt Destination inter-packet arrival time in millisec-
onds
33 tcprtt TCP connection setup round-trip time; sum of
‘synack’ and ‘ackdat’
34 synack TCP connection setup time; the time between
the SYN and SYN ACK packets
35 ackdat TCP connection setup time; the time between
the SYN ACK and ACK packets
37
Additional Generated Features
No. Feature Name Description
36 is sm ips ports If both the source and destination IP addresses
and ports are the same then this is flagged with
a 1, else 0
37 ct state ttl No. for each state (6) according to specific
ranges of values for sttl (10) and dttl (11)
38 ct flw http mthd No. of flows that contain HTTP methods within
an HTTP service
39 is ftp login If the ftp session is accessed by user and pass-
word then 1, else 0
40 ct ftp cmd No. of flows that has a command in ftp session
41 ct srv src No. of records that contain the same service
(14) and srcip (1) in the last 100 records, ac-
cording to ltime (26)
42 ct srv dst No. of records that contain the same service
(14) and dstip (3) in the last 100 records, ac-
cording to ltime (26)
43 ct dst ltm No. of records of the same dstip (3) in the last
100 records according to ltime (26)
44 ct src ltm No. of records of the same srcip (3) in the last
100 records according to ltime (26)
45 ct src dport ltm No. of records of the same srcip (1) and the
dsport (4) in the last 100 records according to
ltime (26)
46 ct dst sport ltm No. of records of the same dstip (3) and the
sport (2) in the last 100 records according to
ltime (26)
47 ct dst src ltm No. of records of the same srcip (1) and the
dstip (3) in the last 100 records according to
ltime (26)
38
A.2 UNSW-NB15 Feature and Attack Label Correlation
Feature Attack Label Correlation
sttl 0.5042
ct dst sport ltm 0.3937
ct src dport ltm 0.3415
rate 0.3286
ct state ttl 0.3185
ct srv dst 0.2929
ct srv src 0.2902
ct dst src ltm 0.2800
ct src ltm 0.2765






is ftp login -0.01621
response body len -0.0164











ct flw http mthd -0.0750
dttl -0.0986












A.3 UNSW-NB15 Feature and Individual kNN Accuracy


























ct srv dst 0.6304
ct srv src 0.6272
ct dst src ltm 0.5672
ct dst ltm 0.5595
ct src dport ltm 0.5582
trans depth 0.5539
ct flw http mthd 0.5530
ct ftp cmd 0.5508
ct src ltm 0.5437
ct dst sport ltm 0.5288
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